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INTRODUCTION
Sustained economic growth and development in Africa has been a burning issue for a long time. This paper attempts to evaluate the performance of 
selected African countries in terms of certain conditions for sustained long term 
economic growth and development. These conditions were identified and 
discussed by Harmse (1992), Harmse and De Wet (1994) and De Wet (1995), 
namely: Efficiency in production (brought about by economic liberalisation and 
trade through outward-oriented policies); economic stability and finally a well- 
defined and consistent domestic policy mix which includes fiscal and 
monetary restraint, human development programmes and especially good 
education, promotion of the manufacturing sector, export promotion and an 
unyielding policy stance. Several studies on Sub-Saharan Africa argue 
convincingly that the economic realities of Africa call for special attention to be 
paid to imbalances in respect of employment, income, nutrition, health and 
education which all affect the capacity of the human resource (UNECA, 1989; 
Brinkman, 1995; Olofin, 1995). Action which will correct these imbalances, 
entails the creation of an environment in which human resources are 
developed, infrastructure is built and expanded, while institutions as well as 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities to promote exports are cultivated. 
Although it is already contained in the third condition, it would make sense to 
emphasise the importance of the human and physical environment aspect by 
identifying it explicitly as a fourth condition for Africa. We will denote these 
conditions by the acronym ESCE (Efficiency, Stability, Consistency, and 
Environment).
Many African economies experienced a serious socio-economic crisis 
during the 1980s, caused by both endogenous and exogenous factors (Thisen, 
1992:5-6). Increased protection in the rest of the world, the process o f synthetic 
substitution for raw materials and the intensification of bilateralism at the 
expense of multilateralism saw Africa's terms of trade deteriorating rapidly. This 
situation was aggravated by political lipheavals, the great African droughts of 
1983-1985, 1987-1989 and 1992-1993, escalating debt burdens and declining 
resource flows (Thisen: 6-8). Endogenously a lack of the necessary production 
structure, of income generation and distribution processes, together with 
unsuccessful adjustment policies led to devastatingly negative per capita growth 
rates in many African countries (Thisen :7).
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This paper evaluates the adjustment process in Zimbabwe in comparison 
with selected other African countries according to the aforementioned criteria or 
conditions.
EXTERNAL SHOCKS
In the early 1970's, the world was subjected to several external shocks, which 
had a severe impact on many countries. Owing to these shocks a number of 
changes took place in the world, and individual countries were obliged to adapt 
their domestic economies accordingly, more easily so than others. It seems that 
the shocks had less impact on those countries that could make the necessary 
adjustments in time to the structure of their economies. Developing countries 
with an unfavourable economic structure were suddenly confronted with the 
major question of adjusting to these shocks.
Several alternative adjustment programmes could be adapted to this end. 
The Structural Adjustment Programme of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, is one such path that countries could follow. Alternatively, 
owing to the "poor performance" of these programmes in Africa, some African 
countries decided to approach the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) for an alternative adjustment programme designed to address 
the problems of African countries in particular. The United Nations accepted 
this document on November 17, 1989 as a basis for recovery and transformation 
in Africa, with only the USA voting against it (Mwinyi, 1990: 42). Both these 
programmes will be evaluated, as a possible means of adjustment to external 
shocks.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
In general, structural adjustment is typically the transformation from an 
agriculturally based economy into one where manufacturing industry plays a 
major role (Spooner & Smith, 1991: 1). Employment, expenditure, output, 
productivity and prices are all different dimensions of structural change. All of 
them are interrelated and cannot be considered separately. Hicks says, 
concerning structural problems, that "if the difficulty which we find is purely 
monetary, it ought to be possible to find a means of doing something about it, 
but if the monetary problem hides a real problem, no monetary wizardry can 
conjure it away" (Leveson & Wheeler, 1980:165). 'Th is is a simple test for 
structural problems, namely anything that cannot be solved through monetary 
and fiscal policy. It is, however, doubtful whether the problem is so simple. In 
terms of its current use, structural change refers to distortions in the structure 
of production and allocation of production factors in an economy as a result of 
government intervention (Spooner & Smith, 1991: 1). Changes in the availability 
of resources and in international competition are also forces that change the 
economic structure (Griffiths & Wall, 1989: 46). The structure of resource 
allocation on a macro level may be a problem if the balance in the allocation of 
resources, between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, is not in line with the
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requirements for external balance in the economy. It may also be a problem if 
the weakness in resource mobilisation and expenditure planning are contrary to 
the achievement of internal balance. On the micro level, a structural problem 
refers to an allocation of production factors that clashes with the natural 
comparative advantage of the economy. This, in turn, leads to distortions in 
production. The essential role of a structural adjustment policy is to correct 
these distortions. There should not be any difficulty in the adjustment process if 
structural adjustment takes place gradually as the economy changes. There are, 
however, also structural changes that a country cannot simply adjust to, or do 
so only with great difficulty and over a long period of time. Each country is 
unique in terms of its problems, and the implementation of an adjustment 
programme must be approached with caution. The main problem of establishing 
such a programme is its enormous financial cost and the fact that results may 
only be expected in the long run.
THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL AND THE AFRICAN 
ALTERNATIVE
Some of the major development problems in the world today exist in Africa south 
of the Sahara. Structural problems occurred especially after the occurrence of 
the exogenous shocks of the early 1970's, like the serious world recession, oil 
price increases and high real interest rates. The Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) of the IMF and the World Bank as well as the African Alternative 
Framework to Structural Adjustment (AAF-SAP) was developed specifically to 
address these problems.
THE ORTHODOX STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME
The IMF identified the structural problem in developing African countries as 
financial shortage due to excess demand that follows on a rapid expansion of 
credit. The World Bank suggested an adjustment policy to decrease existing 
financial shortages in the ' medium term (3-5 years) by expanding and 
diversifying import and export substitutes. Rectifying price ratios by means of 
exchange rate adjustments would do this. In this way it was expected that 
resources would be allocated more efficiently (Thisen, 1991: 125).
Policy objectives
The objectives of the IMF and the’ World Bank are that countries should increase 
the efficiency of the public sector, eliminate price distortions, liberalise trade and 
increase savings. Both these institutions have agreed to give aid and loans to 
developing countries that accept the following policy measures (Thisen: 125):
- i f  Equalise exchange rates with the rest of the world by devaluating 
currencies set artificially high by governments,
ii) Set higher interest rates that encourage savings and efficient use of 
resources.
3
iii) Exercise tight control of money and credit supply.
iv) Cut back on government spending and less use of deficit financing of 
government projects.
v) Liberalise trade.
vi) Allow the free market to determine prices.
vii) Turn government enterprises over to private businesses.
Although these measures presage difficult times for African countries, this 
is shock therapy that might work well.
THE AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE
The basic theses of the African Alternative are that: (a) no programme or plan 
will work unless it is seen as being indigenously formulated and implemented; 
(b) the diversity of the African situation will not be addressed through the 
application of a standard formula for all of them; (c) the crisis threatening to 
overwhelm Africa must be seen first and foremost as a human one, and not 
merely one of macro-economic disequilibrium; and (d) developmental concerns 
such as alleviation of poverty, improvement of health, nutrition, education and 
productivity, cannot be suspended while resources are consumed by the need to 
correct economic imbalances (Thisen: 123).
The theoretical framework of the AAF-SAP
According to supporters of the "African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programmes" (AAF-SAP), this approach takes the problem of debt 
and trade, as well as structural weakness in Africa, into account. In contrast to 
the IMF/World Bank SAP, the AAF-SAP does not have a theoretical formula that 
can be implemented in all African countries. The socio-economic situation in 
individual countries will determine what measures and strategy should be used. 
A more holistic approach (general equilibrium) is pursued rather than an ad hoc 
(partial equilibrium) approach. It is expressed by means of three modules or 
spheres of socio-economic activity that describe the relationship between the 
production process, distribution of income and the satisfaction of needs (Thisen, 
1991: 136). There is a close interaction between the three modules. Lastly, the 
AAF-SAP contains only broad guidelines and each country must adapt it to its 
own unique situation in developing an adjustment programme.
The framework focuses on five strategic issues:
i) Pursuit of human-centred self-sustaining development strategy and 
economic process;
ii) The transformation from a primarily exchange economy to a production 
economy;
iii) Greater democratisation of the development process and greater 
accountability by policy-makers and public officials;
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iv) Effective mobilisation of social and economic institutions for the tasks of 
adjustment and transformation; and
v) Renewed effort to accelerate the process of economic co-operation and 
integration.
Apart from the framework, the AAF-SAP can be divided into three 
modules. These modules give a brief description of the structure of the 
economy, namely:
Module 1 (Level and structure of production)
They emphasise the domestic economy, with a movement away from an export- 
based economy. They stresses the urgent need for shifting from primary 
production aimed at export markets that antail diminishing returns to producing 
more for domestic and regional markets. Agriculture and mining inputs must be 
used to produce higher levels of final goods. Dependence on foreign countries 
must decline and strategic industries must be granted preferential interest rates 
to acquire more capital. Land reform will increase food production, and 
scientific research must be brought into the production process. Financial 
leakages and capital flight must be stopped. Cutting back on productive 
capacity for the sole purpose of balancing budgets must be resisted. An 
adequate social infrastructure is also important.
Module 2 (Income distribution)
A more equal distribution of income will strengthen the domestic market for 
domestic products and serve to alleviate poverty. An essential condition is better 
access of the poor and disadvantaged, to the means of production, especially 
land, labour and capital. A political environment that encourages sustained 
development and an equitable distribution of wealth must be a national goal. 
Cuts in non-essential government expenditure, especially military spending, are 
necessary.
Module 3 (Satisfaction of needs)
Current production policies promote the export of foodstuffs and discriminate 
against production for domestic consumption. Incentives should favour local 
production. Consumption of goods that can be produced locally must be 
encouraged, and less-important imports discouraged. Trade among African 
countries must increase. Foreign debt suppresses economic progress, therefore, 
new loans should be for projects wjth quick and high rates of return and foreign 
exchange earnings.
Evaluation of the AAF-SAP
Although a theoretical evaluation of the AAF-SAP is possible, the AAF-SAP 
cannot be evaluated in the same manner as the SAP, simply because no country 
has yet implemented it. This is so because of a lack of financial support, as the 
World Bank and the IMF only support their own programmes financially. A
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particle comparison between the two approaches will thus be substituted with 
only several broad differences and agreements pointed out in the summary.
SYNOPSIS
There are areas of agreement between the IMF/World Bank approach and the 
AAF-SAP. These include a better system of financial management and efficiency 
of public enterprises, stricter financial accountability by government, a slowing 
down of inflation, improving incentives for agriculture, diversifying exports and 
more efficient management of foreign debt.
There are naturally obvious differences between the two approaches too. 
The orthodox SAP implies that the problems of developing countries are mainly 
due to a shortage of funds for development. To counter this problem it is 
recommended that countries must restore internationally realistic price ratios by 
exchange rate adjustments. Interest rates must increase to support savings, 
and better management of the supply of money and credit is necessary. 
Government expenditure must be restricted and the public debt reduced. A 
policy of privatisation must be implemented, and trade liberalised to increase 
international competition.
The AAF-SAP approach, favours a human-centred adjustment programme 
with recovery and development talcing place simultaneously. A conventional 
free-market approach cannot work in Africa, according to them. If protection is 
a worldwide phenomenon, the liberalisation of traue will have no advantage. 
Because of the inability of the market to eliminate distortions, government 
intervention is necessary.
Against the background of this synopsis the paper will further evaluate to 
what extent the adjustment policies applied by the six selected African countries 
since 1980 have been successful. The evaluation is done in terms o f the already 
mentioned universal conditions for obtaining and maintaining sustainable 
growth and development. These conditions, once again are Efficiency in 
Production, Economic Stability, a Consistent Domestic Policy Mix and the 
Correct Economic Environment (ESCE).
EFFICIENCY IN  PRODUCTION AND WELFARE GAINS
Sustained long-term growth and development depend primarily on increased 
efficiency in production. From this follow welfare gains such as higher per capita 
income and increased employment (Harmse & De Wet, 1994:89-93). This 
efficiency can be sought through different economic growth and development 
strategies. Outward orientation in the form of trade liberalisation, promotion of 
manufacturing exports and steadfastness in the application of chosen policies, 
seems to be the most effective way (Harmse and De Wet:98-99). According to 
Olofin (1995,10): " Such a growth strategy would have to be capable not only of 
promoting properly executed import substitution but also export substitution, 
such that the export ratio would not rise phenomenally but would be
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accompanied by diversification in production as well as exports". This approach 
Constitutes the typical IMF/World Bank approach.
A second approach is that of inward orientation. The AAF SAP program 
supports to a great extent this type of approach. This implies import substitution 
programmes through protectionism policies (tariffs and quotas), exports 
subsidies in favour of primary products and overvalued currencies (World Bank, 
1987:82-83). However, this approach appears to be ineffective over the long 
term (Harmse & De Wet, 1994:88-89).
The countries under evaluation, like the majority of Sub-Saharan 
countries, adopted inward oriented industrialisation strategies in the late 1960s 
(World Bank, 1987:105-106) as the means of achieving economic development. 
Given favourable world commodity prices, these countries were able to use the 
proceeds from their buoyant exports to stimulate domestic manufacturing. 
Olofin (1995:12) argues that an important factor which hindered or slowed down 
progress of African countries towards outward orientation was that the 
governments of these economies, "blessed" with enormous natural resources, 
did not see the need for liberalisation. The World Development Report (World 
Bank, 1987: 106) showed that from 1965 to 1973, the region's industrial activity 
grew at 14 per cent per year. Yet, this growth declined dramatically during the 
1970s to 5 per cent per year between 1973 and 1980 and became negative 
between 1980 and 1985. The countries on which this study focuses, exhibited 
this pattern in particular. The share of industrial production stagnated, while 
manufacturing production stayed low in all of them with the exception of 
Zimbabwe (Table 1). Mining production continued to play a major role in all 
these countries and influenced economic growth heavily. Such growth therefore 
depended largely on world commodity prices that were beyond the control of 
these countries (Thisen, 1992:7). Inefficient manufacturing production resulted 
from formidable resource constraints, including a critical shortage of labour and 
other skills as well as inadequate infrastructure (Thisen 6). Their 
industrialisation programmes failed to deliver manufacturing exports. The 
industrial sector therefore consumed a great deal of foreign exchange from 
increased imports while massive excess capacity developed (World 
Bank, 1987:105-106). The current accounts of many of these countries came 
under pressure (Table 4) and not much welfare gains through increased 
employment and output surfaced (World Bank: 106).
The inward-oriented policies created high-cost, inefficient manufacturing 
industries. Exchange rate policies were characterised by overvalued currencies, 
which discriminated against exports. This contributed to lower profitability and 
discouraged investments in the export industries (World Bank: 106). Tariffs and 
quantitive restrictions protected domestic manufacturers from foreign 
competition and this fostered inefficient local production. The shortages of 
foreign exchange caused a booming black market and smuggling flourished. 
Price and import controls in the case o f manufactured products were ineffective 
and black markets also emerged for these controlled items. Nationalisation 
increased the inefficiency of industries and foreign investment was discouraged 
(World Bank: 106-107).
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The lack of significant manufacturing growth as a result of inward- 
oriented industrial strategies (Table 1), as well as stagnation or instability in 
agriculture (Table 8) and export activities (Table 7) contributed to a decline in 
welfare and growth (Table 2) from the seventies to the mid eighties. In reaction 
some of the countries made radical policy changes after 1985.
ZIMBABWE adopted an economic adjustment program based on import and 
price controls, government allocations of foreign currency and high levels of 
government spending with resultant deficits in the middle seventies (Choplin and 
O'Leary, Zimbabwe: A-2). Low levels of investment (0.12 per cent of GDP) and 
GNP growth (-0.8 per cent); unemployment (20 per cent) and increased levels of 
inflation (12 per cent) prevailed until. 1987 (Tables 2-3 and Choplin & 
O'Leary, 1992: Zimbabwe FS-2). As was the cage in Zambia, improved world 
prices for metals and other commodities, good rains which led to robust 
agricultural output and a depreciating currency fuelled an economic recovery 
which lasted until 1991 (World Bank, 1994/95:34). The real economic growth 
rate improved from a negative rate of 1.3 per cent in 1987, to levels of 5,6 per 
cent (1989), 4.2 per cent (1990) and 4.9 per cent (1991) (Choplin 8s O’Leaiy: 
Zimbabwe FS-2).
On the basis of this recovery, the government launched a five year 
liberalisation programme in 1990 to improve the efficiency of domestic 
production (Choplin & O'Leary: Zimbabwe A-6). The aim was to diversify the 
economy, increase manufacturing exports and attract new foreign investment. 
The programme was designed to introduce outward orientation in the form of 
export incentives, to increase capital goods imports, to reduce the budget deficit, 
and to lift state subsidies and price controls. Signs of success during the early 
1990s were limited to a continued increase in manufacturing (Table 1). However 
the volume of exports have declined sharply since 1990 (Table 7) and 
unemployment has increased (World Bank, Choplin & O'Leaiy, 1992: Zimbabwe 
FS-2). Efficiency in production thus still has to be completed and rounded off.
ECONOMIC STABILITY
The second condition for sustained long-term economic growth and 
development, is internal and external economic stability. If there is no economic 
stability, no SAP will bring about economic development (Hiemenz 8s 
Langhammer, 1986:125). Also of importance is the way in which a country 
attempts to effect this stability/If if is done the wrong way, serious instability 
may result. Internal stability means stability in domestic prices and external 
stability implies balance of payments stability, including that of the real 
exchange rate and a healthy external debt position. Studies of country 
experiences (Harmse, 1992) show that adjustment to external shocks and 
balance of payments crises can accumulate staggering levels of foreign debt in 
countries pursuing inward-oriented trade strategies. Many Sub-Saharan 
countries, unfortunately, have had this experience.
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Balance of trade distortions in all of the countries studied in this paper, 
except Botswana, has led to heavy foreign borrowing in an attempt to offset the 
effects of instability (Table 5). Over-valuation of their currencies and rising 
government deficits has resulted in balance of payments instability for most'of 
them since the eighties. NIGERIA and BOTSWANA (Tables 4, 5 and Choplin & 
O'Leary, 1993) are notable exceptions. Internal instability through increasing 
rates of inflation, still remains a problem (Table 3) in all these countries.
The liberalisation programs of ZIMBABWE (1990) and MALAWI (1986), 
brought about accelerating inflation rates (Table 3) and heavy foreign debt 
(Table 6). Although the reform program of Zimbabwe won the approval of the 
international financial community (Choplin 8s O' Leary, 1992: Zimbabwe A-6), 
economic stability has worsened. The current account remains in deficit 
(Table 5), while negative net direct foreign investment continues, despite the new 
investment code introduced in 1991 (Table 9 and Choplin & O’Leary, 1992: 
Zimbabwe A-6 )
MALAWI’S current account has displayed deficits ever since 1980 (Table 4 and 
World Bank, 1994/95:79). The country continued to finance these deficits with 
increasing foreign debt, which doubled between 1980 and 1990 and reached a 
level of 85 percent of GDP by 1993 (Table 6). At the same time net foreign direct 
investment completely dried up (Table 9). Macroeconomic instability in Malawi 
thus continues.
BOTSWANA'S liberalisation or adjustment programme has restored a good 
measure of economic stability since 1987 (Jefferis 1993:2). Gross international 
reserves increased more than tenfold, to $3300 million plus, between 1970 and 
1990 (World Bank, 1994:272), constituting 16 months of import coverage in 
1995 (Table 6), as part of an active macroeconomic stabilisation policy to avoid 
balance of payments crises (Jefferis, 1993:3). The rate of inflation increased from 
8 per cent in the middle 1980s, to a mere 10 per cent in 1996 (Table 3), which 
represents a marginal increase compared to the other Countries in the region. 
Botswana avoided many of the negative economic effects, which may result from 
a booming export sector (Jefferis, 1993:6-8). In particular windfall gains in the 
export sector were not used to finance excessive levels of imports. By 1995, the 
current account of the balance of payments was still in a surplus (Table 5), with 
foreign debt still at a very low level (Table 6). Although central government 
expenditure as share of GNP has increased notably since 1972, the mineral 
sector and a substantial inflow of net foreign direct investment (Table 9) have 
generated enough foreign reserves and government revenue, to prevent 
‘government expenditure from absorbing all foreign reserve gains (Jefferis, 
1993:3-4). Botswana's relative political stability has also contributed to a 
political commitment to follow appropriate stabilisation policies (Jefferis: 3-4).
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DOMESTIC POUCY MIX AND POUCY CONSISTENCY
Many studies o f trade liberalisation strategies stress the necessity of policy 
consistency and the correct internal policy mix to assist trade and development 
policies (Harmse, 1992; Harmse & De Wet, 1994; and Hiemenz & Langhammer, 
1986). The challenge to developing countries in respect o f their domestic policy 
approach, is to become outward-oriented, maintain fiscal and monetary 
restraint, promote saving and investment, avoid excessive borrowing and not to 
make abrupt changes in policy measures. A wide belief in the Keynesian 
message has been a main reason for the inability of African economies to move 
more successfully from primary import substitution to efficient and sustained 
long-term industrial production and exports since the 1960's. Large government 
deficits and cost-push inflation, fuelled by an increase in the money supply with 
concomitant low interest rates and the believe that governments must and 
should manage affairs have been and still are the policy approach in many of 
these countries (Olofin, 1995:13) . As is well known, the Keynesian approach 
also fosters pump-priming, fine-tuning and other forms of regular policy 
changes, which are not recommended by the conditions of ESCE. Many Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan African Countries stagnate around Primary Import 
Substitution (PIS) or oscillate between (PIS) and the Secondary Import 
Substitution phase (SIS), moving from control regimes , to partial, feeble 
liberalisation and back to control and strict regulation. (Olofin, 1995:12).
The maintenance of positive real rates of interest and stable exchange 
rates is a prerequisite to attract private savings that can be allocated amongst 
alternative investment opportunities. A reduced and new pattern of public 
expenditure is necessary: expenditure on education, health, science and 
technology, infrastructure and environmental protection must receive the 
highest priority (Harmse 1992, and Harmse & De Wet, 1994:97-98). (See also 
Environment). '
The only country in Sub-Saharan Africa studied in this paper to adopt 
such a consistent domestic policy mix was Botswana. Nigeria could have been 
quite successful, but for the fact that it lacked consistency in its promising 
policy approaches. Zimbabwe has had mixed results.
In ZIMBABWE the government's policy mix, as part of its adjustment programme 
of economic liberalisation during 1990, was aimed at gradually dismantling the 
existing system of public control and inward-orientation. It comprised fiscal 
restraint by attempting to reduce the budget deficit to 5 per cent of GDP, by 
promoting exports through export incentives and by restructuring the heavy tax 
system and the unprofitable parastatals (Choplin and O'Leary, 1992: Zimbabwe 
A-6). Limited signs of success and early consistency indeed exist. The objective of 
reducing the government budget deficit was reached in 1993 when the deficit as 
percentage of GDP was 4.4 per cent (World Bank, 1994/95: 186). The reform 
plan has also begun to win the approval o f the international financial community 
as net direct foreign investment increased substantially to $22 million by 1993 
(World Bank: 80) Although doubts remain as to how extensively it will be.
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implemented, investor confidence has been bolstered by the: "diminution of the 
regime's socialist rhetoric and by Mugabe’s new commitment to economic 
liberalisation, especially in trade and investments (Choplin & O'Leary, 
1992:Zimbabwe A-6 ).
ENVIRONMENT
It has not been possible yet to evaluate the attempts of the selection of African 
countries under study in this paper to create a stable and sustained 
environment, due to a lack of information and statistical data. However, some 
deductions can be made from important development strategy studies, dealing 
specifically with the African problem.
Despite structural adjustment attempts, annual average growth in Sub- 
Saharan Africa as a whole declined further from 3.4 per cent (1967-80) to less 
than 2.0 per cent (1980-1992) and with an average annual population growth 
rate of about 3 per cent, poverty in the region is deepening (Olofin, 1995:4). 
Although, according to Olofin (4-7), the main reasons for this deterioration in 
welfare are low domestic saving and investment as a percentage of GDP plus 
dismal real agricultural and industrial growth, the inability of these African 
economies to create a sound environment is just as important.
The creation of the right kind of environment is necessary to successfully 
enact and particularly to sustain the effect of the first three conditions of 
efficiency, stability and consistency (ESC). The environment must create the 
domain within which economic growth and development can prosper (Focus 48, 
1992:4-5). Without human, institutional and infrastructural development, 
outward-looking growth and development will fail or at best not be sustainable. 
The conditions for a sound and stable environment involve developing human 
resources, building of infrastructure, institutions and technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities to export. (Brinkman, 1995:2).The creation of this 
environment calls for direct government intervention - the so-called 
strijcturalism and neo-structural critique of the neo-liberals (Olofin, 1995:23). 
Such intervention must, of course, in the light of what has been said in earlier 
paragraphs, take place in harmony with and in the context of the other elements 
of ESCE - and in particular with the maintenance of overall fiscal restraint.
In an attempt to address the failure to reduce their vulnerability to 
external shocks, facilitate stable and sustained growth, improve increasing living 
standards, alleviate poverty and promote regional economic co-operation, 
African countries, under the leadership o f the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), introduced several alternative frameworks for 
sustained growth and development in Africa (As had been discussed above). At 
the centre of this alternative framework, is the human dimension " . . .  it is only 
through the motivation and the empowerment o f people as well as the ensuring 
of the equitable distribution of income that development can take place on a 
sustainable basis. An adjustment programme that marginalizes people is 
doomed to failure" (UNECA, 1989:iii). It has not, so far, been implemented 
successfully in the sense that the GDP per capita for Africa in 1994 was lower
1
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than a decade ago and the inhabitants of the region are now on average the 
poorest of any developing region (Brinkman: 1). It may be that the human 
dimension has not been properly implemented or it may also be that it has not 
been tied up properly to the other elements of ESCE. However, this approach 
illustrates how Africans themselves think. In view of the fact that education 
played such an important role in the domestic policy mix o f the successfully 
developing Far Eastern countries (e.g. Jahed, 1995; Schive, 1995), the African 
approach cannot be rejected.
Olofin offers an alternative development strategy for Africa, namely the 
POSH-strategy (Producer Oriented Small Holder Strategy. It still places the 
emphasis on an inward looking industrialisation strategy based on: "(i) initial 
reliance on domestic markets to meet domestic needs; (ii) emphasising labour 
intensive small holder technology and enterprises to take advantage of a relative 
abundance of labour; (iii) cultivating horizontal linkages between agriculture and 
small-scale manufacturing as a way of developing a technological base....; (iv) 
finally, emphasising investment in human capital to increase absorptive capacity 
for domestic and foreign capital." (Olofin, 1995:17). The importance of human 
development is once again noted.
Asante (1995:9) pointed out that both investment in human development 
and in infrastructure take a long time to bear fruit, but that they must be 
initiated during the adjustment period if development is to be achieved. The 
question is whether inward-industrialisation combined with human and 
infrastructure development alone will be sufficient to effect sustainable long-term 
growth and development. At this stage we do not have data available to test any 
hypothesis in this respect for Africa, as was done above in the case of Efficiency, 
Stability and Consistency. It could be argued, however, that a properly 
developed human and physical Environment is a necessary fourth condition. 
Outward-orientation and the increase bring about efficiency in productivity that 
flows from the resulting external competition. Without the development of 
human and physical infrastructure, the domestic agents and economic 
processes will simply crumble before the external competition. Yet, viewed from 
the other side, the development of human and physical infrastructure will never 
be put into full gear to effect long-term growth and development if the potential 
is not triggered and propelled into high productivity by competition from outside 
the country (De Wet, 1995). Thus the addition of a proper Environment in 
respect of human, physical and institutional infrastructure as a fourth condition 
towards possible necessary and sufficient conditions for sustained long-term 
growth and development.
CONCLUSION
External shocks were responsible for economic change to which countries had to 
adjust. The interaction between the economy and polity of a country sometimes 
leads to politically inspired economic decisions, rather than decisions based on 
purely economic principles. This causes problems that can only be addressed 
over a long period of time. There exists a viewpoint that international co­
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operation sometimes amounts to "colonial intervention" and this is perceived as 
a form of subjection. The self-interest of the political leadership should play a 
lesser role than that of the common people. Public participation and support for 
any adjustment programme is both essential to be successful. Uncritical 
popularity simply to seek votes must be prevented if the economy can be harmed 
in the process. So would the voters, whose interests politics ostensibly serves.
Certain broad policy measures for economic growth and development can 
be gained from the experiences of both the successful and unsuccessful 
countries. Policy recommendations would then include the following: 
Deregulation on all levels and a leading role for the private sector. A disciplined 
budget and an equitable distribution of income are important. Quotas must be 
eliminated and tariffs reduced over a wide spectrum. Control over the exchange 
rate must be abolished and left to fluctuate. The government can play an active 
but limited role in support of market forces. Labour problems must be 
depoliticised with increased productivity as an objective. Domestic as well as 
foreign competition must be accepted, and an outward policy implemented. A 
strong manufacturing industry that can function competitively must be a 
priority. In this way the outflow of capital can be discouraged and exports 
promoted. Lastly, services like tourism must be promoted, where many 
developing countries' comparative advantage happens to lie.
Although there may be criticism of such measures, a government must 
persist and be consistent if it wants success in the long term. Political 
popularity may decline in the short term, but the long-term advantages of 
economic growth and higher standards of living, will ensure increased political 
support.
The conditions (Harmse & De Wet, 1994) for sustained long-term growth 
and development appear to apply to the African countries studied in this paper. 
Those countries who persevered in outward-orientation, internal and external 
stability (including fiscal and monetary discipline) and a consistent, correct 
policy mix, enjoy sustained growth. There is but one such country, namely 
Botswana, although Nigeria has also had some success. The other countries 
have been inconsistent in their policy applications and have alternated outward- 
oriented with inward-oriented policies; fiscal and monetary discipline with laxity 
and consequently have experienced various degrees of internal and external 
instability with low or declining growth (see Table 10 for a summary). We still 
need data to test the effect of the fourth condition, namely development o f the 
human and infrastructural environment, although a theoretical argument could 
be made out for its necessity.
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Table 1: Share o f  Industrial and Manufacturing Production In GDP (%)
Industry Manufacturing
1965 1979 1987 1993 1995 1965 1979 1987 1993 1995
Nigeria 13 45 43 32 53 6 5 8 9 5
Botswana 19 41 57 42 46 12 9 6 8 4
Zimbabwe 35 39 43 28 36 20 25 31 22 30
Malawi 13 20 18 18 27 6 12 9 12 18
Zambia 54 41 36 48 40 6 16 23 27 30
Kenya 18 21 19 18 17 11 13 11 12 11
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
Table 2: Growth in Gross Domestic Product and GNP per Capita (%) (1960-1995): Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates
GDP GNP per Capita
60-70 70-80 80-90 90-95 60-80 65-90 85-92 85-95
Nigeria 3.1 6.5 1.4 1.6 4.1 0.1 3.4 0.8
Botswana 4.5 13.9 11.3 4.2 3.0 8.4 6.6 6.1
Zimbabwe 4.3 1.6 2.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 -0.7 -0.6
Malawi 4.9 6.3 2.9 0.7 2.9 0.9 0.7 -0.7
Zambia 5.0 0.7 0.8 -0.2 0.2 -1.9 2.2 -0.8
Kenya 6.0 6.5 4.2 1.4 2.7 1.9 0.9 0.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
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Table 3: Inflation rate: Average Annual Percentage Growth
1960-1993 1990-1996
60-70 70-80 80-90 90-93 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Nigeria 2.6 18.2 17.7 30.5 7.3 13.0 44.5 57.2 57.0 72.8 29.3
Botswana 13.0 8.0 12.0 13.4 11.4 11.7 16.2 14.2 10.6 10.5 10.0
Zimbabwe 1.3 8.8 10.8 27.5 17.3 23.3 42.0 27.5 22.2 22.6 21.1
Malawi 2.4 9.8 14.7 15.7 11.8 12.7 22.6 19.6 34.6 83.3 37.6
Zambia 7.66 8.1 42.2 149.2 117.5 92.6 197.4 189.0 53.6 34.2 45.2
Kenya 1.5. 11.0 9.2 27.7 15.6 19.8 29.6 45.8 29.0 0.8 8.8
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1991-96.
Table 4: Exchange rate stability (domestic currency/US dollar)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Nigeria (Naira) 9.862 19.646 21.882 21.997 21.887 21.886 21.886
Botswana (Pula) 2.07 2.26 2.56 2.71 2.82 3.65 3.80
Zimbabwe (Zim$) 5.05 5.48 6.93 8.38 9.3 10.83 18.62
Malawi (Kwacha) 2.67 4.40 4.50 15.30 15.30 15.32
Zambia(Kwacha) 88.97 359.71 500.00 680.27 1000.0 1282.05
Kenya (Shillings) 28.07 36.22 68.16 44.84 55.94 55.02 62.68
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-96.
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Table 5: Current Account o f the Balance o f Payments: 1985 -1996 ($ Million)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Nigeria 2566 366 -69 6194 1090 4988 1203 2268 -780 -2128 -510 3092
Botswana 81 111 663 188 498 137 336 244 503 243 342
Zimbabwe -76 7 48 117 -3 -172 -489 -617 -115 -328 -425 -
Malawi -124 -89 -55 -53 -138 -64 -194 -223 -117 -182 -450 -
Zambia -398 -350 -248 -295 -222 -597 -227 -284 -165 -449 - -
Kenya -no -37 -494 -460 -579 -520 -215 -98 71 98 -480 -166
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
Table 6: Import Coverage Ratio of Reserves and Total External Debt: 1980-1995
Monthly Import Coverage of Foreign Reserves Total External Debt: ($ million) External Debt/GDP (%)
1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1980 1993 1995
Nigeria 6 2 5 1 0.5 8 934 19550 34538 32531 35005 10 52 140
Botswana 4 11 17 18 22.0 147 351 560 674 699 16.3 15 16
Zimbabwe 3 3 2 3 3.8 786 2 415 3 247 4168 4885 15 44 79
Malawi 1 1 3 1 1.5 821 1 018 1 584 1821 2140 72 85 166
Zambia 1 1 1 0 1.2 3 261 4 576 3 247 6853 6853 90 137 191
Kenya 2 3 2.1 1.1 3 394 4 201 7 126 6993 7281 48 73 98
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
}
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Table 7: Export Unit Values; Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates: 1975-1995
1975-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1990-1995
Nigeria 9.8 1.5 0.9 1.9
Botswana 5.4 -1.6 16.1 0.8
Zimbabwe 5.7 -2.8 8.2 -6.6
Malawi 4.3 -4.1 4.1 -1.8
Zambia -0.1 -6.5 14.6 26.9
Kenya 11.2 -0.8 -3.8 16.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
Table 8: Agricultural Production: iAverage Annual Percentage Growth Rates
1975-1979 1980-1985 1986-1992 1990-1995 |
Nigeria -1.5 2.9 6.7 2.3 1
Botswana -0.7 -0.9 1.1 0.7 |
Zimbabwe -0.9 2.8 -2.8 1.6 |
Malawi 5.2 1.5 0.9 1.7
Zambia -5.4 2.0 0.5 -0.5
Kenya 4.6 3.0 2.1 -0.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
I
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Table 9: Net Foreign Direct Investment : Average Annual ($million)
1975-1979 1980-1985 1986-1992 1995 *
Nigeria 343 210 747 453
Botswana 31 59 76 64
Zimbabwe 0 0 -8 99
Malawi 6 3 0 -14
Zambia 32 26 75 30
Kenya 44 19 30 -42
* Net Private Capital Flows
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various issues); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1994-95.
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Table 10: ESC Summary




ECONOMIC STABILITY DOMESTIC POLICY MIX AND 
CONSISTENCY
Nigeria Average of 3.7% (1990- 
1993), against an average of 
1.8% dining the eighties. 
Per capita growth improved 
between 1985 and 1992.
Limited success due to 
moderate beginning of 
outward orientation. 
Manufacturing: Small increase 
in share of GDP since 1990. 
Exports: Limited growth since 
1990.
Internal and external 
instability have increased 
since 1991. Inflation rate up 
to 73% by 1995 and external 
debt/ GDP ratio to 52% by 
1993.
Inconsistent: Reforms in 1985, 
relaxation in 1988. 
Reintroduced in 1990 but 
followed by excessive 
government expenditure and 
monetary laxity in 1991.
Botswana Lower, but still satisfactory 
levels of growth a£! an 
average of 4.9% 
(1992-1996), against 11.3% 
(1980-90). Per capita growth 
declined, but is still on a 
high level.
Rapid increase in production 
through outward orientation 
due to increased mining 
exports (diamonds). Danger of 
dutch disease imminent. 
Manufacturing: Small increase 
in share of GDP by 1993. 
Exports: Strong growth since 
1985.
Internal and external 
stability prevail. Rate of 
inflation stabilised at 11- 
14%. External debt to GDP 
ratio is low at 15%. The 
current account of the b.o.p. 
stays in surplus.
Consistent with avoiding 
balance of payments crises and 
encouraging direct foreign 
investment. Monetary and fiscal 
discipline. Well-planned public 
expenditure programmes. 
Consistency
Zimbabwe Negative average growth 
(-0.7%) and per capita 
growth rates between 1990 
and 1993.Slightly recovery 
since 1995 due to good 
agriculture crops
Partial success due to limited 
outward orientation.
Export unit values: Strong 
growth since 1986. 
Manufacturing: Decreased 
shares in GDP between 1987 
and 1993.
Internal instability: Rate of 
inflation increased to 27.5% 
by 1993(17.3% in 1990). 
External instability: External 
debt to GDP ratio increased 
to 44% by 1993.
Limited signs of success and 
consistency. Government 
budget deficit decreased and 
direct foreign investment 
increased by 1993.
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ECONOMIC STABILITY DOMESTIC POLICY MIX 
AND CONSISTENCY
Malawi Rapid deterioration in 
average growth rate since 
1980.
Per capita growth is also 
on the decline.
Unsuccessful outward 
orientation lead to 
inefficient production and 
deficient growth. 
Manufacturing: Share in 
GDP stagnant. Exports: 
Low growth since 1990.
Internal instability: Rate 
of inflation increased to 
83.3% by 1995 (11.8% 
in 1990). External 
instability: External debt 
to GDP ratio increased 
to 85% by 1993.
Lack of consistency in 
policies supportive of the 
SAP. Fiscal and monetary 
laxity.
Zambia Improved but low average 
growth (2.2%) and average 
per capita growth (2.2%) 
between 1990 and 1993.




share since 1987. 
Exports: Strong recovery 
from 1985 onwards.
Internal instability: Rate 
of inflation increased to 
189% by 1993(117.5% 
in 1990). External 
instability: External debt 
to GDP ratio increased 
to 137% by 1993.
Stop and go policies since 
1985 have been 
detrimental to stability and 
growth.
Kenya Rapid decline in average 
growth rate to 0.9% 
(1990-1993), against 4.2% 
(1980-1990). Per capita 
growth rate on the decline 
since 1990.
Adjustment process is not 
successful due to slower 
industrial growth caused 
by inward orientation. 
Manufacturing: Share in 
GDP low. Exports: 
Negative growth rates.
Internal stability sine 
1994: Rate of inflation 
decreased to only 0.8% 
in 1995 (45.8% in 1993). 
External instability: 
External debt to GDP 
ratio increased to 73% 
by 1993.
Lack of consistency in 
policies supportive of the 
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